ISK is a characteristic of existence. Attempts to avoid it explain such arrangements as insurance, limited liability firms and diversification of investment portfolios. In recent years, risk aversion and the attendant premium for risk-bearing have been used increasingly to explain a stubborn paradox in the empirical exchange rate literature: the failure of the forward exchange rate to he an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate.
( j_~j*= where = log of I plus 13.5. three-month T-bill interest rate, = log of 1 plus foreign equivalent of T-hill rate, F, = log of the forward exchange rate (dollars per foreign currency unitl, 5, = log of the spot exchange rate (dollars per foreign currency unit(, a = annualizing thctor -12 divided by number-of months in the forward contract.
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The right-hand side of fl, which is the annualized forward premium on foreign currency, measures the rate of return in domestic currency on a covered exchange pusition -that is. a spot purchase offoreign currency offliet by a forwar-d sale. The equality with the differential between the domestic and foreign interest rate on the left-hand side is brought about by arbitrage: since the bonds are assumed to be default free in their respective currencies, a riskless excess return would be available if CIP did not hold.'
Because the forward rate is the present contractual dollar price of foreign currency for future delivery, the assumptions of market efficiency and no risk premium imply a second form of interest pai-it~called uncovered interest parity (UIP(. An expression fur VIP can he obtained from the arbitrage condition which equates the expected change in the spot rate plus the premium for risk with the forward premium:
(2( E,[S,.kl-S, ±P. = s.x'here EjS, = the expectation of the period-t + k spot rate based on period-t inforrnation, P = the risk premium for bearing the uncertaints' of unexpected currency price changes.
Under the no-risk-premium hypothesis, Comparing equation 4 with equation 1, VIP implies that the forwar-d rate, F',, which is observable to the market at time t, is equal to the market's forecast of the future spot exchange rate at time t + k. Note that uncovered interest panty is conditional upon the hypothesis of no risk premium; onE' if ul holds will the annualized rate of the expected change in spot rate be equal to the current interest differential.
t'he risk premium~P,, on buying a cun'encv in the forward market is implicitly defined by equation 2. That is, individuals who do not \•vant to bear the uncertainty of holding an open currency position buy forward currency to hedge this risk. As shown in the left-hand side of equation 2, the price these hedgers pay includes the risk premium, the price of insuring against this uncertainty. It is the difference bet~~'een tIP has been supported in a variety of empirical investigations; see Clinton (1987) and Isard 1987, pp. 7-8. the log of the forsyar-d rate and the log of the expected, hut unobservable, future spot rate,
For-instance, if the risk premium is positive, speculatots sell foreign currency forward at price F, and expect to he able to buy the foreign currency spot at time +k for E,S.~, profiting by doing so at rate P (annual rate aP,(. Note that, if the risk premium is not zero, the ntai-ket actually can expect the dollar to depreciate, even though the observed interest differential and the forward premium indicate an appreciation of the dollar.'
Risk Premium or Market Inefficiency
Current investigations of the relationship between the spot and forward exchange rates are premised on a widely documented finding: the simple no-riskpremium efficiency criterion, defined jointly by equations 2 and 3, has been refuted by many empirical studies. Using a variety of assumptions, data, time periods and estimation techniques, investigators have established three fundamental points:
ii The forward exchange i-ate is not an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate.
z 'rhe residuals obtained in a regression of spot exchange r-ates of their lagged forward rates livquenttv exhibit serial conelation,
3) There exist systems filters; that permit profitable sper:ulation in fur-eign exchange either through the pur'cbase of foreign assets u•'ith offsetting forward exchange sales or buy and hold strategies.
'An example may clarify this relation among the premium, torward rate and expected tuture spot rate, Suppose the dollar-OM spot exchange rate is $.5512/DM, the three-month forward rate is 8.5494/CM, and the expected future spot rate three months hence is 8.5556/CM. Since the risk premium is negative, the speculative position wilt be against the dollar rather than against the CM. The speculator (whose beliets are represented by the expected tuture spot rate) would expect to make a profit by selling dollars torward and buying DM assets. After holding the DM assets for three months, the speculator anticipates selling the CM assets and using the proceeds to buy dollars, The speculative rate ot profit -that is, the excess over a hedged, secure return -anticipated over the three months is, trom equation 2, 1.12 percent or 4.49 percent on an annual basis:
.0449 'These characteristics have been widely discussed. For the biasedness of forward rates, see Robichek and Eaker (1978) . Levich (1979) , Cumby and Obstfeld (1981) , Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Meese and Rogoft (1983) . The serial correlation ot errors has been noted by Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Cumby and Obstteld (1984) . On the existence of profitable speculation through "titters" (obtained from lagged data) see Levich (1979) , Bilson (1981) and Sweeney (1986) .
Given the ample empit-ical evidence, most r-esearchers accept the rejection of the simple no-risk-premium efficiency criterion; however, they remain divided on whether the existence of a risk premium or market inefficiency is responsible for this result.
Why has it been so difficult to test for the presence of a risk premium? The answer' is that while, in general, we do not have actual cx ante expectations data, we assume that foreign exchange market participants are rational in their-decisions, including their pricing of risk. Hence, the expectation of the future spot rate is equal to its actual, subsequently observed value plus a random ertor and, perhaps, a risk premium. Consequently, whenever the observable value of F,-S,~k is different from zero, ther-e is cx post evidence on the existence of a risk premium or market inefficienc or both, but no direct evidence bearing on which.T he empirical difficulties in assessing the presence of a risk pt-emium fi-om simple calculations of F,-S,., can he gather-ed from chart 1. In this chart, we have plotted the so-called ey post or rational expectations risk premium, F-S. -' (annualized;, for the dollar/ deutsche mark exchange rate from January 1976 through June 1985. As is eyident, it is difficult to show that the forward i-ate systematically underpr-edicts or overptedicts the future spot rate. When long periods of time are consideted, the average prediction er-rot-of the forward exchange rate is close to zero. Fortunately, however, two direct tests for the presence of a risk premium in the foreign exchange mar-ket have emerged from the liter-ature.
TWO TESTS OF EFFICIENCY AND RISK PREMIA
Recently, two studies of exchange rates have offered tests that sepat-ate the t-ational expectations hvpothesis and the existence of a risk premium. These papei-s use different methods, time periods and data sets, and they arrive at clifferent conclusions about the relative importance of the risk premium and expectation errot's.
'Of course, this is conditional on expectations being rationally formed, Even so, unforeseen events transpiring between time t and +'k may result in F,-S,K ± 0. Such unforeseen events, dubbed "news" by Frenkel (1981) explains some variation in F,-S,,,due neither to a risk premium nor nonrational expectations; however, news should not result in biased expectations since unforeseen events must have an expected meafl of zero.
The first paper is F'ama's 1984) article, which assesses the relative variability of the risk pr'emium and forecast errors during 1973-82. Fama concludes that the risk premium explains more of the var'iance than the forecast error does.Fur1her-more, he also finds that the i-isk premium and the expected (but unobserved; futur-e spot rates at-c negatively crt-related.
The second paper, Frankel and Froot (1986;, uses the median response from survey data of foreign exchange traders' expectations of future spot rates.' Their study, primarily covering 1981-85, finds a risk premium varying between 3 percent and 10 percent depending on the currency observed. Thus, they are able to test directly the rational expectations hypothesis and to estimate the proportion of the forward rate error' that can be ascribed to forecast error and to risk premia.
Their findings concur with Fama's in two respects
the risk premium is significant and negatively correlated with the expected future spot rate -but diverge in terms of the relative variances of forecast errors and risk premia:
In all three surveys, the errors exhibit unconditional bias ofa sign opposite to estimates of the r'isk premium from the survey data. The premia are large in absolute value, and are statistically different from zero. We can reject the hypothesis that systematic unconditional mistakes made by the forward r-ate in predicting the future spot r'ate are due entir'elv to a failure of rational expectations. But at the other extreme, the hypothesis that the forward rate prediction errors can be explained by the risk premium alone is also r'ejected. Expected depreciation is more variable than both the forwar-d discount and the risk premium. The first finding corroborates Fama's 1984) conjecture that expected depr'eciation and the risk premium are negatively correlated. 't'he second finding rejects the hypothesis that the variance of expected depreciation is less than the variance of risk pr-emium 'Frankel and Froot used three different surveys: Money Market Services (MMS), Inc., biweekly January 1983-October 1984, weekly 1984-86, polled an average of 30 currency traders or economists at major international banks; The Economist Financial Report every six weeks June 1981-December 1985 conducted telephone interviews with currency traders at 14 leading international banks; finally, Amex Bank Review 1976-85 annually surveyed 250-300 central and private bankers, corporate officers and economists. In each case, respondents were asked for exchange rate forecasts at various horizons for the pound, mark, Swiss franc, yen and (except for MMS) French franc. Details of these surveys can be found in the data appendix of Frankel and Froot (1987) , p.
151.°F rankeland Froot (1986), p. 29. Originally, this negative correlation was presented by Fama (1984) as a puzzle; however, as shown in Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) , it is perfectly consistent with the intertemporal asset pricing model of forward exchange markets. 
Assessing the Divergent Findings of Fama and Frankel-Eroot
The two papers, which use very different methodolog~es,concur in the statistical significance of a risk premium, but are in dispute about its economic significance. On the one hand Farna's paper, as well as others whose research has followed his lead, asserts that the risk premium accounts for most of the forward rate error.
7 An implication is that the efficiency of forward exchange markets is not refuted.A corollary of this implication is that, since foreign exchange trading is not subject to biased forecasts, policy intervention in foreign exchange markets cannot be justified on the existence of destabilizing and misguided speculation.
In contrast, the findings of Frankel and F'root assert that, although the risk premium is statistically significant, it is smaller in absolute value and vanabilityj than the forward rate forecast errors made by the surveyed traders, economists and corporate officers of international banks. Moreover, they find that the expectations of these surveyed traders are systernatically biased, that their speculative activity is excessive and that the risk premium is without econonuc significance:
'rho data continue to rejeC statistically the hypothesis of rational ex 1 jectauons ... iii favor of the alternative of excessive speculation... Put diflei-enUv, even after oh owing br' measuiemem citOt', it s still not possible to ujout the hypothesis that all the bias co,isists of ivpcaird e~x;x,ct;i:wnaIerrors made In' survey rc,spon-(1(3~IIS a,icl f/iRt '10 positive portion of the bias can be at tr,bv:td to the~survev risk prefnn,m.T hese disparate findings require some resolution. Besides the different statistical methodologies used there are two fundamental differences between their analyses. First, the two papers use different data sets for their empirical tests: Farna's study cover-s data ohsen'ed at four-week inteivals fl-ow August 1973 through December 198Z, while Frankel-Froot's data are of varying frequency over primarily 1981-85.' Fama's sample covers nine exchange rates, including the six that Frankel-Froot examine. Second, the F'rankelFront study uses survey data rather than the ex post market observations for the expectation proxy. This 7 For example, see Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) . Frenkel (1986) and Boothe and Longworth (1986) . SFrankS and Froot (1986) Survey responses may deviate from market expecta-t ions first because a single observation rather than a weighted average forms the datum. That is, FrankelFroot use the median response to represent the tvpical market agent. in contrast, when expectations are deduced from market actions (actual portfolio postlions or changes in position), the expectations of every active agent are included in a composite average with the weights being asset holdings or changes in asset holdings. This population-weighted, distributionb ased expectation may differ considerably from the median proxy especially if the tails of the expectation distribution contain the beliefs of the agents making the largest purchases. If differences of opinions as well as changes in information move markets, then median survey responses will offer incomplete guides to market expectations.
A related, but slightly different aspect of the difference between survey and market data is that the latter is substantiated by action. Surveys are frequently mi&-leading in that agents are not disciplined in their responses by having to take positions that risk wealth. Put differently actions speak louder than words, or talk is cheap. For normally distributed future spot rates, such ambiguity would not mattet-since mode and mean are equal; if the distributions are asymmetric, however, lOFranke~.f root (1986), p.
4 .
mode and mean are unequal." Consequently the respondents interpretations become important, and changes in the median respondent, the identity of the responding institutions or their spokesman makes the interpretation of survey expectations even more problematic.
Since these are unavoidable properties of survey data, they cloud the interpretation of survey~based findings. The other two possible sources of the dispatity between the findings -different data and different time periods -can be tested. ForFarna's study, reestimation of the model will determine whether, over the latter period on the same data, his results still diverge from those of Frankel and Froot. Thus, in the next section, we reestimate Farna's model over a period including the 1981-85 period and use the same data source as Frankel and Fmot.' 2
FAMA'S TEST FOR A VARIABLE RISK PREMIUM, AN EXTENSION
Fama's 19841 test for a variable risk premium decomposes the forward premium (FL~Sj into its two components: the expected change in the spot i-ate I ES and the risk premium P1 as shown in equation 2. Fama then consider-s two n3gi-essions using the foiward premium as the explanatoiy variable and each of the two components of the foiward premium -the forwaj-d rate error, F',-S, -and the actual change in the spot rate, S. -S -as dependent variables:
S, 1 -S, = aZ + bZ(F-S! + eZ.
In these regression equations, b2 estimates the accuracy of the forward premium in predidling the actual change in the spot rate, whereas bi reveals the risk premium component of the forward premium. Since the premium and forward rate errors may have nonzero covariance, the coefficients in (61 and (7) cannot he used directly to measure the proportion of variation due to risk and forecast errors, but the difference between them does provide some information.
The difference between the two estimated coefficients, bi -hz), provides statistical evidence on the proportional importance of variation in the risk premium vs. variation in the rational future spot rate forecast error as sources of variation in the forward premium. Specifically, ifbi -bZ is positive and statisticallv significant, most of the variation in fotward premium is due to variation in the risk premium.
4 Conversely, if hi -b2 is negative and statistically significant, most of the variation is due to variation in the expected change in the exchange rate. Finally, if hi -b2 is not significant, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about the source of variation.
iThal is, when distributions are not symmetric, the different statistics that survey respondents might interpret as expectations' will be wid&y divergent. When thstributions of future spot exchange rates are symmetric, the mean and mode (most likely future exchange rate) are the same. Also, Ihe odd moments of a symmethc d~stribu-tion are zero, so that skewness could not influence a survey respondents answer. If distributions are asymmetric, however, the mean and mode will diverge and nonzero skewness (the third moment of the distribution) nhluence the risk premium and, hence, the survey response. For example, consider two alternative distributions for the DM one month in the future: I. Symmetric Distribution (likelihood) $667 (10%). $606 (80%), $545 (10%).
II. Asymmetric Distribution (likelihood)
$667 (20%), $606 (80%) In each distribution, the mode is $606. which is aiso the mean of I but, the mean of II is $618. Thus, the statistEc that respondents repoit as theft expected va~uematters for distribution U, but does not matter for distrthutEon I. 2 Frankel and Froot (1986) use spot and forward exchange rate data from DRL while Fama (1984) uses data from Harris Trust Nafion& Bank of Chicago. In the results reported fl tables I and 2, we use DRI data. and Since the covariance term appears in the bi and b2 regression coefficients, neither bi nor b2 can be used by itself to assess the relative contribution of risk or forecast error to the forward premium; however, since they have a common denominator, r2(F,~S),the difference between bi and b2, which does not contain this term in the numerator, can be used to provide evidence about the proportional contribution or risk and forecast error,
l4The standard error of bi -b2 is twice the common standard error of bi and b2: Since (6) and ( One possible reason that different sample pei-iods Fama 1973-82; Frankel-Froot, 1981-85 ) yield different results is that the structure of markets was' have changed during or between these periods. Economists have argued that the so-called peso problem makes the 1973-76 period difficult to intcTpret±0th-ei-s have aigued that the development of foreign exchange markets, learning curve behavior of agents and the evolution of floating exchange rate policy are other reasons why subpenods may differ in structure. In partiuular, sevei-aI authors have presented evidence that a change in the monetai-v 1-egirne in the United States during the last quarter of 1979 may have caused a sliuctural change.~Consequently, we have estimated Fama's model, equations C and 7, over all COWbinations of the three subperiods of 1976. 01-1985,06: 1~Thepeso problem refers to the deva(uation of the Mexican peso which was anUcipated throughout the 1973-76 period and which occurred n ear'y 1976. More generauy, it refers to any anticipated exogenous event that does not occur within the sample period. See Krasker (1979) and lsard (1987) . 6 See Isard (1987) .
"'For example, see Ott and Veugelers (1956) and Frenkel (1986) . -statistics for tests of these structural breaks over the 1976-85 period against the null hypothesis of no breaks are reported in table 1. These Chow tests are used to determine the proper estimation subperiods to be reported in table 2. As the first column oltablé 1 indicates, Canada, France, Italy Japan and Switzerland do not i-eject the hill-period structural stability hypothesis, and their regression estimates in table 2 are for the undivided full period, indicated by B + I) + S. Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the Uniled Kingdom reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level or better, and their regression estimates are reported by the appropriate subperiods.'T able 2 reports the regression estimates of (6) and (7) for the nine currencies whose structures were examined in table 1. Overall, the bi -b2 test reported in the ThThe ater starting dale also avoids the peso probtem; see Krasker (1979) . '~tnte~estingly. the data for none of the countries supported the afternative hypothesis that the Before and Since subperiods were the same. Germany and B&gium provided evidence that all three periods were d~ssjmilar, white the Netherlands and the United Kingdom indicated that the Before and During subperiods were similar but ointly different from the Since subperiod.
Fama's Specjfication Estimated by Subperiods, 1976-85
last column reasserts the relative importance of the risk premium that Fama found in his original tests. This result holds both for currencies that revealed structurally differentiated subperiods and for currencies that did not, that is, Canada, Italy, Japan and Switzerland. Of the nine currencies only the Belgian franc and the French franc failed to support the statistically greater importance oIthe risk premium over the expected change in the exchange rate.zO The other results reported in table 2 indicate that the results are quantitatively sirn~1arto those reported by Farna for the same currencies over a shorter sample and different data set.
CONCLUSION
Markets for foreign exchange are well-organized, high-volume interactions that encompass the trading activities of many competitive profit-seeking agents. That is, they appear similar in many functional as-20 But even for Beigkim and France, the difference bl -b2 was positive so that forecast error variance was not greater than risk preniia variance for any currency.
pects to other (domestic) financial markets so that the hypothesis of efficiency is plausible. Empirical tests, however, have rejected the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and no risk premium in the foreign exc hange market. That is, while CIP holds, UIP does not.
Consequently, the role of the risk premium in foreign exchange markets often was not distinguishable from market inefficiency until Fama's 1984) analysis provided a test of its importance in the foreign exchange market. Frankel and Front (19861 have provided survey~based evidence that also supports the existence of a risk premium but conflicts with Fama's assessment of the risk premium's economic importance. We have replicated Fama's study for an extended sample period and, although the results varied substantially by subperiods, found results that in geneial corroborate Farna's findings. What this impasse suggests is that the economic significance of the risk premium will not be resolved by tests of its existence but may require direct modelling of the portfolio choice problem from which it arises 2 '
